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CONSTITUTIONAL HERESY? 
MARK R. KILLENBECK* 
Every year, every one of us who teaches an introductory course in 
constitutional law is forced to make extraordinarily difficult decisions about 
what to include and what to leave out of the syllabus. In particular, after settling 
on which aspects of the subject we will teach, we confront the reality that we 
simply cannot ask our students to read all the cases that really matter. Borrowing 
from one of my favorite poets and poems, we do not have “world enough and 
time.”1 
In the face of this, in each of the past several years, I have contemplated 
committing constitutional heresy. In the main, my students want to learn what 
they need to pass the bar examination. For most of them, that means they want 
me to tell them the so-called Black Letter Rules. The reality that a given 
constitutional rule provides a starting point, rather than an answer, does not 
much concern them. Case X involves a claim of discrimination on the basis of 
race. What’s the rule? The simple answer is strict scrutiny: “all racial 
classifications . . . must be analyzed . . . under strict scrutiny” and “are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
governmental interests.”2 The fact that the Supreme Court has provided scant 
guidance about how we are to tell the difference between an interest that is 
“compelling” and one that is simply “important,” the standard invoked for 
classifications based on gender,3 troubles them, if at all, only a little. Narrow 
tailoring in turn, requires a delicate, case-by-case fact-sensitive review by the 
Court. Each of the particular means selected must be “specifically and narrowly 
framed to accomplish that purpose.”4 Who cares!! What’s the Rule!! 
 
* Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. Many thanks to 
Joel Goldstein, exemplary scholar and good friend. 
 1. The line is from Andrew Marvel, To His Coy Mistress, which may be found in many 
places, including in the truly great collection, FRANCIS CONNOLLY, MAN AND HIS MEASURE 535–
36 (1964). 
 2. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 3. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996) (explaining that gender-based 
discrimination requires “an exceedingly persuasive justification,” which means the State must show 
that the challenged classification serves “important governmental objectives” and that the 
discriminatory means used are “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives” 
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))). 
 4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
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More to the point, virtually none of our students will on graduation, or 
throughout their subsequent careers, “practice” constitutional law. The 
Constitution will structure and direct virtually every aspect of their professional 
lives. But actual, living breathing constitutional law clients and claims will by 
and large not occupy their time.5 Moreover, few, if any, will ever participate in 
a case posing the issues that most people associate with the construct, 
constitutional law. And so, I ask myself, repeatedly, why am I wasting my time 
teaching Brown v. Board of Education?6 
Don’t get me wrong. Brown is a great case. The Court’s opinion triggered a 
series of defining moments in American legal, political, and social history. 
Nevertheless, what exactly does it contribute in a course that supposedly 
prepares our students for the actual practice of law? As I will note and argue, the 
honest answer is practically nothing. Especially when the students learn that the 
“rules” that govern any school desegregation claims today were not promulgated 
in Brown.7 But as I will also note and argue, this vision of what we do elevates 
law over justice, and it is my continuing rejection of that path that has, at least 
to date, saved me from the ultimate constitutional sin. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
The body politic generally thinks of the Constitution in ways that reduce its 
scope and meaning to the core guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
is understandable. We live in a country that (mostly!) celebrates Thomas 
Jefferson’s misleading embrace of “truths” that are “self-evident,” “equality,” 
and “unalienable rights,”8 supplemented by the Pledge of Allegiance’s 
 
 5. One possible exception is the extent to which they prosecute or defend those accused of 
crimes. There is a substantial body of what we might call constitutional criminal procedure that 
permeates such matters, involving claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. 
Those provisions and cases are, however, not taught in a constitutional law course per se and not 
generally viewed as parts of the “real” constitutional regime. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1128–29 (1996). 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This is the first of two decisions by the Court so-styled. The second 
is known as Brown II. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). It focused on remedies, answering the two questions 
the Court posed to the parties in Brown I. My references to Brown in the main text of this article 
are to Brown I. Virtually no one thinks of it that way, and I will not so describe it. 
 7. See infra notes 6, 44, 45, 52 and accompanying text. 
 8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Jefferson who penned 
those words was also the Jefferson who owned slaves and, in an extended meditation on 
government and human nature, “advance[d] . . . as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether 
originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites in 
the endowments both of body and mind.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 
180 (David Waldstreicher ed., Palgrave Publishers Ltd. 2002) (1788). This and similar sentiments 
voiced at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified cast an interesting light on both Jefferson 
and on Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1857). See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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celebration of a land in which there is “liberty and justice for all.”9 If, as Justice 
Wiley Rutledge declared in the wake of World War II, the difference between 
the United States and the Axis powers was that we lived in a land where the 
Constitution establishes a regime of “[l]aw, freedom, and justice,”10 then surely 
those portions of the Constitution most directly associated with those precepts 
matter the most. Which makes it arguably appropriate to reduce it to a document 
that bars “depriv[ations] of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” 
and forbids “den[ials of] . . . the equal protection of the laws.”11 
Law students enter their first constitutional law course with visions of 
affirmative action, abortion, flag burning, same-sex marriage, and the like 
dancing in their heads. They are then understandably shocked and appalled when 
they learn that the constitutional provisions that will actually matter in their 
future practice are far removed from these hot button issues. Standing? Yuck. 
The Commerce Clause? Double yuck, since it has both positive and negative 
dimensions.12 Egad! Where is the Constitution we envisioned? 
This due process/equal protection fixation is understandable. These are the 
constitutional provisions that best articulate American notions of justice and fair 
play. They are also constitutional provisions at issue in a minuscule portion of 
the cases litigated before the Supreme Court, albeit the ones that feature in a 
majority of those that actually command public attention. Very few people 
understand that the Court’s docket is dominated by issues and controversies far 
removed from the sexy parts of the Constitution. As I write, thirty-two cases 
have been accepted for argument and decision in October Term, 2017.13 Only 
four of them involve the sorts of issues most people think of as 
“constitutional.”14 The remainder are relatively obscure matters of statutory and 
 
 9. For a general discussion of the Pledge and the constitutional issues it poses, see Mark 
Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. 
L. REV. 529, 530 (2007). 
 10. WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 10–11, 18 (1947). 
 11. I insert here the obligatory footnote making it clear that the quoted language may be found 
in U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and add the observation that anyone who needs a proper Bluebook 
citation to find the source of that language probably won’t understand it or much of what follows 
in this Article. 
 12. For a dose of reality in such matters, see Mark R. Killenbeck, A Prudent Regard to Our 
Own Good? The Commerce Clause, in Nation and States, 38 J.S. CT. HIST. 281 (2013) (noting the 
central place of the Commerce Clause in matters constitutional). 
 13. October Term 2017, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2017 
[https://perma.cc/6Q4D-R786]. The numbers will have changed by the time this article is in print. 
The pattern of high-profile core constitutional issues as the exception rather than the rule will 
remain. 
 14. Two of the four grow out of the Trump administration’s executive orders on immigration. 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 551 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554, 606 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Hawai’i 
v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1231 (D. Haw. 2017), vacated in part, remanded in part, 859 F.3d 
741, 789 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). One focuses on partisan 
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regulatory interpretation, often mired in the constitutional equivalent of 
President Bill Clinton’s ruminations on “what the meaning of is is.”15 
This does not mean that constitutional issues and concerns do not lie deep 
within virtually every case that comes before the Court. No actor in the federal 
system can undertake anything without constitutional authority. Many areas of 
practice invoke constitutional rules and norms, if only in passing.16 That said, 
the vast majority of the cases litigated in our system are not the sort of matters 
that long detain those who wax eloquent about the “great” constitutional 
principles and rules. 
The reality is that few, if any, individuals care much about the details of the 
Court’s actual work, much less the vast bulk of what constitutes “constitutional 
law.” Consider for just a moment the Court’s October 2017 Term. The cases 
everyone is talking about as October 2, 2017, approaches are not those that 
involve parsing the nuances of, for example, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.17 Or, as will be the situation in the first cases argued this Term, the 
intricacies of the intersection between two federal statutes.18 No. They are the 
ones involving the Fourteenth Amendment. In some instances, either due 
process or equal protection is directly addressed. In the forthcoming partisan 
gerrymandering case, for example, the questions presented pose variations on 
the “one-person, one-vote” principle, which is an equal protection claim.19 In 
 
gerrymandering. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844 (W.D. Wis. 2016), prob. juris. noted, 
137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). The final one presents a combination of compelled speech and free exercise 
claims. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
 15. For an excellent example of where the travails of statutory interpretation might lead us, 
see Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1091 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (resorting to Dr. 
Seuss’s book, One Fish, Two Fish, Red Fish, Blue Fish, in the course of a discussion about whether 
fish are “tangible objects” for the purposes of a prosecution for “destruction or removal of 
property”). On Bill Clinton and his linguistic gymnastics, see Michael Novak, President of All the 
People, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 337, 353 (2002) (“Clinton was willing to take 
any perspective on is that won him a moment’s affection and support. He hung loose with 
metaphysics.”). 
 16. Virtually all attorneys in virtually all areas of practice, for example, will at some point 
consider whether a given procedure meets the due process thresholds articulated in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). There is nevertheless a substantial difference between the 
claim that Procedure X did not reduce or eliminate “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used,” id. at 335, and constitutional law writ large. 
 17. See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (holding that Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule). 
 18. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (exploring whether the terms of an employer/employee agreement to invoke 
arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act in contravention of the National Labor 
Relations Act). 
 19. See Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (“[S]tate legislatures must ensure that districts are 
approximately equal in population, so that they do not violate the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle 
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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other cases, the connection to the Fourteenth Amendment is indirect, via the 
selective incorporation principle, which makes most of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights applicable against the states. For example, in one case currently 
commanding widespread public attention, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission, Jack Philips is claiming that he can refuse to provide 
his services to a same-sex couple as a matter of free speech and free exercise of 
religion. That triggers First Amendment scrutiny only because the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes those protections applicable against 
the states.20 
The most recent Supreme Court nomination and confirmation brouhaha 
amply illustrates this reality. Battles rage each time someone is nominated to fill 
a vacant seat on the Court. Each of the many groups that claim a right to 
pontificate on such matters has a lens through which it views the nominee. 
Invariably, that lens is the Fourteenth Amendment. Pundits and the body politic 
worried at length about Judge Neil Gorsuch’s views on the usual suspects. I must 
confess that I paid scant attention to the confirmation process and debates. 
Predictably, the Editorial Board of The New York Times focused its initial salvos 
on potential “negative consequences for workers’ rights, women’s reproductive 
freedom, politics uncorrupted by vast sums of dark money, the separation of 
church and state, the health of the environment and the protection of the most 
vulnerable members of society.”21 As the day of reckoning came closer, it 
returned to these themes, lamenting the potential arrival of a Justice likely to 
support “consistently conservative results,” highlighting “women’s access to 
contraception” and “abortion rights and affirmative action.”22 
To be fair, some news coverage focused on Justice Gorsuch’s views about 
whether courts should defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a 
statute.23 Such forays were the exception rather than the rule. I am accordingly 
confident that few if any of the individuals or groups that assumed center stage 
 
 20. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and 
do assume that freedom of speech [is] . . . protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) 
(“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the 
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”). 
 21. Editorial, Neil Gorsuch Faces the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), www.nytimes. 
com/2017/03/20/opinion/neil-gorsuch-faces-the-senate.html. 
 22. Editorial, Neil Gorsuch, The Nominee for a Stolen Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/neil-gorsuch-the-nominee-for-a-stolen-seat.html. 
 23. Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(asking courts to determine whether an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute “is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute”), with Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]here’s an elephant in the room with us 
today. . . . [T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge 
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”). 
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in these debates cared about, much less discussed, Neil Gorsuch’s views on 
matters that are much more central to our actual constitutional order than the 
usual politically sensitive subjects. What about Wickard v. Filburn?24 Wickard 
is an obvious example of a truly important area of concern, as it embraced a 
reading of the Commerce Clause that would appall the apparently dedicated 
originalist Justice Gorsuch appears to be. In this instance, it is the dreaded 
“substantial effects” principle, under which Congress may regulate a purely 
local activity “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”25 Then there is Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, another obvious choice for originalist ire, resolving as it did a 
longstanding debate about whether Congress could use the commerce power to 
regulate the states.26 Garcia placed the State of Missouri, to choose one 
example, in the same category as a distillery,27 a lumber mill,28 and a steamboat 
company.29 Is it appropriate to reduce state “sovereigns” to “mere” commercial 
actors? Would the Framers and Founders accept “federal regulation of the janitor 
of a State building” as within the power of the Commerce Clause?30 Doubtful. 
Ruminations on the opportunities and challenges posed by teaching the 
Fourteenth Amendment are accordingly appropriate. For better or worse, issues 
posed by that provision dominate constitutional discourse. This does not mean 
that we actually spend much time looking at the entire Amendment. Mostly, we 
study Section 1. Even then, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is relegated to 
secondary status, an exile arguably justified by the Court’s evisceration of that 
provision in the Slaughter-House Cases.31 Some attention is paid to the 
enforcement powers granted by Section 5, albeit almost always as a variant on 
the due process/equal protection emphasis that defines “appropriate” legislation 
in the light of the level of judicial scrutiny afforded certain rights and certain 
 
 24. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 25. Id. at 125. That was true even “though it may not be regarded as commerce.” Id. The reality 
that Wickard contemplated regulation of any activity, “whatever its nature,” id., was conveniently 
ignored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in 
which the Chief blithely quoted this language from Wickard and then ignored its clear import when 
he declared that the federal commerce power embraced only “activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction.” Id. at 561. He and his brethren had every right to impose 
this “economic activity and only economic activity” limitation. They also had an obligation to be 
candid about what they were doing. 
 26. 469 U.S. 528, 530–58 (1985). 
 27. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 10, 26 (1888). 
 28. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108, 123–24 (1941). 
 29. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 30. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 130 (1987). 
 31. 83 U.S. 36, 74–75 (1873) (limiting the scope of the Clause). But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999) (breathing life into the Clause’s protection of the right to travel and 
guarantee that once an individual becomes a citizen of a state that person has the privileges and 
immunities “enjoyed by other citizens of the same State”). 
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groups of people.32 Then there is Section 2, which some of us have worried about 
in the past, largely to no avail.33 Sections 3 and 4? Well, with the possible 
exception of someone writing for this issue, who cares? 
I now take this process one step further, concentrating my attention on the 
Equal Protection Clause and, more narrowly, equal protection litigation where 
the claim is that a given government action initiates or perpetuates 
discrimination in the structure and delivery of K-12 public education. And I ask, 
why teach Brown? 
II.  BROWN IN THEORY AND BROWN IN FACT 
Very few cases decided by the Supreme Court achieve iconic status, and 
very few constitutional principles are regarded as central to our identity as a 
nation. Brown is an iconic case.34 In his Childress Lecture providing the 
introduction to a symposium marking Brown’s fiftieth anniversary, William E. 
Nelson declared that Brown is “surely the most important case decided in the 
Twentieth Century by the Supreme Court of the United States.”35 The 
constitutional principles for which Brown stands, in turn, are viewed as 
indisputable and indispensable. The Court has emphasized repeatedly that 
“[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality.”36 In particular, “racial discriminations are in most circumstances 
 
 32. Compare Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66–67 (2000) (declining to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity for claims of discrimination on the basis of age), and Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 367–68 (2001) (same, for disability), with Nev. Dep’t 
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–30 (2003) (holding that abrogation is proper for claims 
of discrimination on the basis of gender), and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) 
(permitting abrogation when a state denies the fundamental right of access to the courts). The 
Court’s abrogation inquiry is whether the legislative remedy is “congruent and proportional” to the 
constitutional violation. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737. Most of us have enough sense to cut through that 
high-falutin’ gobbledy-gook and ask, does the classification or right get heightened scrutiny? If so, 
a constitutional violation is possible, and abrogation is permissible. 
 33. See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck & Steve Sheppard, Another Such Victory? Term Limits, 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Representation, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121 
(1994). 
 34. Even here, caution is called for. As Scott Powe reminds us, it was one thing for the Court 
to discard separate but equal in Brown I, quite another to make that action a legal and educational 
reality. The remedial questions posed and supposedly answered in Brown II were accordingly 
extraordinarily important. But the decision itself, and the “all deliberate speed” process it initiated, 
were another matter entirely. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 50–70 (2000) (discussing Brown II and its initial implementation). 
 35. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 
48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795, 795 (2004). 
 36. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745–46 (2007) 
(quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995)). 
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irrelevant and therefore prohibited.”37 This reflects the reality that a racial 
classification “demeans the dignity and worth of a person [who is] judged by 
ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”38 
The “rules” are clear. Race is a “suspect” classification, a primary exemplar 
of a “discrete and insular minority” whose protection requires “more searching 
judicial inquiry.”39 This means “that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and are “subject . . . to 
the most rigid scrutiny.”40 In its current formulation, we describe this as “strict 
scrutiny,” which means that “such classifications are constitutional only if they 
are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”41 Famously 
characterized under its most rigid form as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,”42 
this level of review erects a daunting barrier that few if any racial classifications 
can survive. Indeed, it is fair to say that no traditional form of racial segregation 
or discrimination has withstood strict scrutiny and that only a limited number of 
so-called “benign” or “affirmative” such measures have emerged intact from this 
judicial cauldron.43 
Brown is then a perfect example of this. Except it isn’t. The Brown Court 
does not lay out any of the elements of what we have just discussed. It simply 
declares that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ 
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”44 There is 
no mention of discrete or insular minorities, compelling interests, or narrow 
tailoring. Those notions might be present in one or more of the numerous prior 
cases that the Brown Court cites and, in some instances, quotes.45 But they are 
not part and parcel of the discussion in Brown and a reasonable reader would 
have no idea that they are elements of the applicable legal framework. 
Some of this is understandable. Brown was litigated and decided at a point 
where the current equal protection doctrines and rules were still evolving. The 
first use that I could find of the descriptor “strict scrutiny” in the modern sense 
occurred in 1942, when the Court stated: “our view that strict scrutiny of the 
 
 37. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 38. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). 
 39. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 40. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 42. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 43. See, e.g., Grutter, 439 U.S. at 322–44 (holding that University of Michigan Law School’s 
use of race in admissions furthered a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored). 
 44. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 484, 495 (1954). “Separate but equal” is, of course, the 
formula for invidious discrimination embraced by a narrow majority of the Court in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 45. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 491–92 (“Six cases involv[e] the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine 
in the field of public education.”); id. at 493 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)); 
id. (quoting McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950)). 
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classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest 
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or 
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal 
laws.”46 This was followed quite soon by Korematsu’s use of what is in effect 
the current formulation, when the Court (mistakenly, we now know) credited the 
government’s claims of true national security threats and accepted the contention 
that “the need for action was great, and time was short.”47 Over time, the Court 
developed an analytic framework within which it spoke of “strict scrutiny” and 
the need to use the “compelling state interest test” when the government invoked 
“any suspect criterion such as race, nationality, or alienage.”48 But the first 
extended application of the current two-part formula in a case involving racial 
classifications did not come until 1978, in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke.49 
It is in one respect then hardly surprising that this line of analysis was not 
followed in Brown. Except, of course, for the fact that on that very same day, in 
a companion case, the Court did declare that “[c]lassifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our 
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”50 That allusion to what we now 
regard as the “Black Letter” understanding is telling in two ways. It shows that 
the Court was well-aware of the framework within which modern equal 
protection doctrine was being developed. But it also reveals the extent to which 
the Court believed it essential to focus not on dry, legal abstractions—i.e., the 
Black Letter Rules—but rather on the need to recognize that “[o]f the ideals that 
animated the American nation at its beginning, none was more radiant or 
honored than the inherent equality of mankind.”51 Brown was, as Richard 
Kluger’s magisterial study tells us, a matter of Simple Justice. 
A second major problem with Brown, at least for those who might need to 
litigate such matters today, is that it does not provide either the general matrix 
within which such causes of action are evaluated (suspect class, strict scrutiny, 
etc.), or the specific tests a court will apply to a school desegregation claim. 
 
 46. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 47. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). In effect, the government lied 
to the Court. See Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases, DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES (May 20, 2011), https://www.jus 
tice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-ameri 
can-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/E7HT-CRF2]. 
 48. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). 
 49. 438 U.S. 265, 289–99 (1978). Even here, the Powell opinion concludes its analysis with 
the statement that “[w]hen [classifications] touch on an individual’s race or ethnic background, he 
is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 299. 
 50. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 51. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, at xi (1976). 
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Cases decided in the wake of Brown have placed a strong emphasis on two 
critical factors, especially in a jurisdiction where there was no constitutional or 
statutory mandate to operate a dual system. A prima facie case is not made out 
by arguments about “the effect of segregation itself on public education.”52 
Rather, it requires that a litigant show two things: intentional governmental 
actions that were designed to create or maintain segregated schools, and the 
existence of racially identifiable schools caused by those actions.53 The current 
cases have also added an additional complicating factor: the extent to which 
claims that government motives are “benign” or “affirmative” might change the 
analysis, not by relaxing its rigor,54 but rather by shedding new light of what 
sorts of interests might be deemed compelling. If as Justice Harlan alleged, 
“[o]ur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens,”55 does that mean that the desire to help a group previously burdened 
cannot justify race-based actions?56 
Simply put, Brown was an easy case, assuming we accept its central 
premise: that the Constitution simply will not tolerate state actions that “separate 
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race,” since it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”57 It was in this sense that Brown represented a judgment that any 
“explicit racial classification [that] imposes burdens on one race [will be] 
struck . . . down without reference to purpose.”58 
 
 52. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 484, 492 (1954). 
 53. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200–05 (1973). Keyes highlighted an 
important consideration for litigants in the wake of Brown: the distinction between “a school district 
where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute,” id. at 255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 
and one where there are simply “racially inspired school board actions.” Id. at 203; see also Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (noting the potential problems 
posed by “de facto segregation,” a racial imbalance in schools absent a showing of discriminatory 
action of school authorities). 
 54. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[T]he standard of review 
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by 
a particular classification.” (alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989))). 
 55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 56. So, for example, in Parents Involved the school districts believed that diversity in K-12 
education should be deemed a compelling governmental interest and that race-based school 
assignments should be permitted. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 722 (2007). The plurality did not reach that question, holding that the measures were not 
narrowly tailored. Id. at 723–25. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts articulated a color-blind principle 
on steroids, declaring that: “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.” Id. at 748. 
 57. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 58. Survey, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1091 n.86 (1969) (citing Brown as the 
example). 
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School desegregation cases brought today will be much more difficult to 
litigate and prove. I never say never when the question is whether a government 
actor will do something truly stupid. We have (hopefully) left behind the days 
of the Southern Manifesto,59 when discrimination could be explained and 
defended as a proper regard for “habits, customs, traditions, and way of life.”60 
State legislatures and local school boards are simply not going to pass measures 
that place before all to see the express goal of intentionally separating school 
children on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. But that is what it 
likely takes to provide a plaintiff with an iron-clad case: a government decision 
that clearly and intentionally creates, or, in the wake of prior such actions, 
perpetuates, racially identifiable schools. Read with care, that is the standard the 
post-Brown cases impose. 
Even here, there are hidden dangers. Most of the cases were decided during 
a period where the Court was receptive to such claims and the cumulative, 
negative effects of the prior de jure segregation regime were impossible to 
ignore. That’s not the world we live in today. In particular, it is not the world 
where the neighborhood school principle collides with the reality that population 
and attendance patterns can and will produce racially identifiable schools in 
circumstances where there is scant apparent connection to actual government 
action. 
Consider, for example, the problems posed by one of today’s educational 
fads: school choice. Today’s choice advocates champion these programs as ways 
to allow parents to find a suitable school for their children and, by “voting with 
their feet,” to put pressure on schools and school boards to improve sub-standard 
schools. There is much to be said for this. But what do you do when school 
choice is made available in a jurisdiction where the present effects of past 
discrimination remain, and virtually unrestricted school choice becomes a means 
for promoting white flight?61 
 
 59. See 102 CONG. REC. 4515, 4515 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (discussing and placing 
in the record a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles” now known as the Southern Manifesto). 
For a comprehensive treatment of the Manifesto, see Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern 
Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053 (2014). 
 60. 102 CONG. REC. 4516. For an insightful discussion of these issues, see JASON SOKOL, 
THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945–1975 
(2006). 
 61. See, e.g., Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1061 (W.D. Ark. 
2012) (listing under “Stipulated Facts” the substantial racial disparities between two school 
districts); Hardy v. Malvern Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 956696, at *2 (W.D. Ark. 2010) (noting as an 
“undisputed material fact” that there were approximately 300 students illegally enrolled at majority-
white school districts and that “[e]ach of these students was Caucasian”). Teague and Hardy were 
two of the many cases litigated in Arkansas in which the underlying claim was that unrestricted 
school choice facilitated white flight in a state where attendance patterns reflect a long and 
unfortunate history of state-sanctioned segregation. 
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Post-Brown cases provide a way for individuals concerned about such 
matters to assert a claim that school choice programs that are not predicated on 
documented educational needs pose real risks of abuse and, where they lead to 
white flight, constitutional violations. The Warren and Burger Courts were, for 
example, willing to finesse the intent component by holding that “actions having 
foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the 
ultimate fact, forbidden purpose.”62 In a similar vein, they restricted the ability 
to argue that the problem complained of was simply a private act or decision, 
stating in no uncertain terms that “[r]acial discrimination in state-operated 
schools is barred by the Constitution and ‘[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may 
not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is 
constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.’”63 A legislature or school board 
might argue, perhaps correctly, that promoting white flight was not what they 
had in mind when they passed the statute allowing choice. What do they say, 
then, in the face of evidence that such flight is occurring, given the Court’s 
declaration that “[a]dherence to a particular policy or practice, ‘with full 
knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in 
a school system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a 
court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be 
drawn.’”64 
These and similar post-Brown precepts arguably remain good law.65 They 
are, nevertheless, principles that arise outside of Brown and may or may not 
appear in the casebooks. They are also cases and rules that may well be 
repudiated or limited by a Court that does not now view these matters in the 
same way as the Warren and Burger Courts. Indeed, perhaps the most troubling 
prospect for Brown is the possibility of a Supreme Court in particular, and 
federal bench in general, that embraces an “originalist” view of the Constitution. 
This is neither the time nor the place to probe the various possible strands of 
 
 62. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. 
v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538–39 (1979) (noting the legal significance of both “acts or 
omissions” (emphasis added)).  
 63. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973) (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. 
Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475–76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)); accord City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (stressing that government actors should not become 
“passive participant[s]” in racial exclusion fostered by private actors). 
 64. Penick, 443 U.S. at 465 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp. 229, 255 
(S.D. Ohio 1977)). 
 65. I refuse to teach one such line of post-Brown cases, those that articulate a “political 
process” principle under which the Court invalidates government actions that “aggravat[e] . . . the 
very racial injury in which the State itself was complicit.” Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (2014); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 
467, 470 (1982); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967). I stopped teaching these cases 
a long time ago. They were simply too complicated to explain and, as the result in Schuette 
demonstrates, too problematic in today’s climate. 
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originalism and their application to the question the Court asked, and avoided, 
in 1954: “What evidence is there that” the individuals who drafted, debated, and 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment “contemplated, or did not contemplate, 
understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public 
schools?”66 
The Court asked for reargument on this question and it was extensively 
researched and briefed by the parties and their many friends. The Court then 
declared that “[t]his discussion and our own investigation convinced us that, 
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem 
with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.”67 That is, at best, a 
punt. The question is not whether the individuals who framed and ratified the 
Amendment expressly contemplated school desegregation. It is, rather, whether 
they tolerated or even encouraged it when they returned home, especially in the 
northern states. If, as most strands of originalism propose, the question is 
properly answered in terms of what the people who ratified a textual provision 
or an amendment actually did themselves when they structured and delivered K-
12 education, the answer must surely be a resounding: “No, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not bar such actions.”68 
Consider, for example, Ohio, the home state of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
principal author and champion, John Bingham. As the United States noted in the 
materials it submitted to the Court, Ohio’s “general school law of 1864, which 
was in force at the time of Ohio’s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
authorized and required separate schools for colored children whenever their 
number in a district or in adjoining districts exceeded twenty.”69 Indeed, the 
United States continued, in 1871 the Supreme Court of Ohio, in “the first case 
in which the highest court of a State passed on the effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on racial segregation in the schools,” declared that “the school 
segregation law of the State did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”70 
 
 66. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953). 
 67. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). 
 68. In the brief he filed on behalf of the State of South Carolina on reargument, for example, 
John W. Davis stressed that “of the thirty-seven states in the Union at the time of the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘23 continued, or adopted soon after the Amendment, statutory or 
constitutional provisions calling for racial segregation in the public schools.’” KLUGER, supra note 
51, at 546. 
 69. Appendix to the Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 329, Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. 
 70. Id. at 330, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 69, at 335 (citing Ohio ex rel. 
Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871)). The Garnes court reasoned that since the state did not 
deny “the citizenship of colored persons, and their right to the ‘equal protection of the laws’” prior 
to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment contains “nothing conflicting 
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It remains to be seen if the individual currently occupying the office of the 
President will be able to nominate and secure confirmation of additional 
members of the Court in the originalist mode he seems to champion. Just as it 
remains to be seen if Justice Gorsuch’s originalist creed takes him down a road 
that not even Robert Bork was willing to travel.71 Be that as it may, the original 
understanding/intent problem provides one final note of caution regarding the 
place for Brown in the teaching canon. 
III.  BROWN IS DEAD! LONG LIVE BROWN!! 
So why teach Brown? Why teach a case that doesn’t provide much help in 
terms of the governing law? The simple answer is almost certainly the same one 
that impelled the Court to do what it did in Brown: there is law, and then there 
is justice. In some very key instances, they are just not the same. Brown may or 
may not be “emblematic of the Court’s position as a defender of minority rights 
and as the avant-garde in social justice struggles generally.”72 Regardless, it is 
important for our students to consider Brown in the light cast by a fuller sense 
of what are, and are not, exemplars of justice in our political, legal, and social 
systems. 
As I noted at the outset of this Essay, appeals to Thomas Jefferson as an 
adherent to the American ideal of liberty and justice for all are fraught with 
risk.73 This is not simply a matter of did he or didn’t he, Sally Hemmings 
division. It is, rather, a complex mix of what Jefferson actually thought about 
“all men” and what the Constitution actually created in 1787. Jefferson’s 
musings on the nature of “blacks” in his Notes of the State of Virginia place his 
general views on equality in a far different light than is the norm. In a similar 
vein, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s statements about race and slavery in 
Dred Scott bear closer examination. The received wisdom is that we must reject 
out of hand, with vigor, both Taney and Dred Scott.74 Except, what exactly is it 
that Taney said in that case? The key passages, properly understood, are not 
simple paeans to the glories of slavery and denunciations of slaves as mere 
chattel. Rather, they are unfortunately accurate descriptions of the manner in 
which the individuals who crafted the Constitution approached the question of 
 
with the statute authorizing the classification in question, nor the decisions heretofore made 
touching the point in controversy in this case.” Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 209. 
 71. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 74–84 (Simon & Schuster Inc. 1991) (1990) (arguing the Brown Court properly articulated a 
“presumption of freedom” that the framers did not understand). 
 72. Richard Thompson Ford, Symposium, Brown’s Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1305 
(2004). 
 73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 74. That was generally true before the current monuments and men kerfluffle triggered by the 
unfortunate events in Charlottesville, Virginia. It is even more pronounced now. 
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slavery, given the need to fashion a compromise that would keep the southern 
states in the federal fold. 
The question, Taney says, “is, whether the class of persons described in the 
plea . . . compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this 
sovereignty?”75 His answer was not that slaves are inherently inferior as a matter 
of law and fact, although he almost certainly believed that such was the case. It 
was, rather, that the individuals who drafted and ratified gave us an instrument 
predicated on the assumption that in 1787 slaves were “considered as a 
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their 
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power 
and the Government might choose to grant them.”76 He then made it quite clear 
that this was true in spite of what the Declaration of Independence had to say 
about “the whole human family.”77 Jefferson and company, Taney stressed, 
“perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used” and “knew that it 
would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro 
race.”78 
Demeaning? Yes. Utterly unfounded? Absolutely. Inaccurate, in the sense 
that it did not represent the views of the individuals who demanded the 
protection of slavery as the price of ratification? No. I have not reviewed the 
countless constitutional law casebooks to determine how each treat Dred Scott 
and whether their edits of the case provide the text and context to see exactly 
what Taney was saying. I suspect that many do not. Even as I also suspect that 
virtually every casebook includes the full text of Brown. 
Brown does not mention, but clearly repudiates Dred Scott. That is part of 
its appeal. It is also not a decision whose moral force depends on its step-by-step 
analysis and rejection of all prior precedents. But that strength can be a weakness 
when the case is part of a course within which the focus is on traditional legal 
analysis, appeal to precedent, and the other virtues and vices that inhere to what 
some have described as a quest to teach students to “think like a lawyer.” 
A far more compelling reason to teach Brown is the story of the decision 
itself: the long, rich, and inspiring narrative that is the full account of the four 
school segregation cases that came to the Court in 1953. Brown itself was one 
of four cases on appeal that were heard together by the Court.79 The others 
 
 75. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857). 
 76. Id. at 404–05. 
 77. Id. at 410. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951). One of the interesting 
historical artifacts is that in this case, and the others brought in federal court, the matters were tried 
to a three-judge district court, with a concomitant right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954) (outlining the litigation that led to Brown). 
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challenged school segregation in South Carolina,80 Virginia,81 and Delaware.82 
There are also the many that followed in its wake, both to enforce the Brown 
principles,83 and extend them far beyond the limited confines of separate but 
equal in public education.84 We may or may not teach these cases, or even 
mention them. They are nevertheless key elements in the full story of Brown. 
There are also the practical dimensions and realities of “landmark” 
litigation. There is a tendency on the part of students and the body politic alike 
to think that a lawsuit is a quick and easy solution to pressing problems. The 
classic civil rights chant captures this nicely. What do we want? Justice! When 
do we want it? Now! That’s not the real world of civil rights and civil liberties 
litigation. It was certainly not the world or reality that produced that decision. 
Brown was the culmination of a protracted and painstakingly crafted strategy 
that proceeded one small step by one small step toward an ideal, yet to be fully 
realized: the attainment of true equality for African Americans in a nation that 
had enslaved their ancestors and then subjected those who followed to 
subjugation, violation, and myriad gross indignities. 
That process was initiated by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (“NAACP”) in the early years of the twentieth century. One 
of the first targets was housing, in the form of statutes that barred the sale of 
property to African Americans. In 1917, in language that presaged doctrinal 
developments yet to come, the Court characterized a combination of 
constitutional and statutory guarantees as ones that protected “those fundamental 
rights in property which [they were] intended to secure upon the same terms to 
citizens of every race and color.”85 “The Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court 
declared, “and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to 
qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without state legislation 
discriminating against him solely because of color.”86 
I suspect we would search in vain in virtually every constitutional law 
casebook for any protracted consideration of Buchanan. That may be a good 
 
 80. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 530 (E.D.S.C. 1951). 
 81. Davis v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 103 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Va. 1952). 
 82. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 863 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 83. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (rejecting 
“all deliberate speed” and imposing on the school board the obligation to fashion a desegregation 
plan that “promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now”). In a companion 
case, Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School District, 391 U.S. 443, 447 (1968), the 
Court rejected a precursor to the school choice program now at issue in Arkansas. See supra note 
61 and accompanying text. 
 84. See, e.g., State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, 533 (1959) (per curiam) (barring 
racial discrimination in “athletic contests”); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) 
(per curiam) (same, public golf courses); Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (per 
curiam) (same, public beaches and bathhouses). 
 85. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917). 
 86. Id. 
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thing in one sense. More than once, the Court mentioned the fact that the statute 
in question “den[ied] [a white the ability] to dispose of his property” only 
because he wished to sell it to a “person of color.”87 The Court also rejected an 
attempt to question Plessy and separate but equal, stating that “[t]he most that 
was done was to require him as a member of a class to conform with reasonable 
rules in regard to the separation of the races.”88 The evil condemned was an 
absolute denial of access, rather than differential treatment. Buchanan was 
nevertheless a notable victory and laid important foundations for what was to 
come.89 
Brown itself mentions the next essential phase, the various cases brought to 
end racial segregation in higher education. Two things were important here, one 
that our students should recognize, and one that is alien to them. The first and 
obvious consideration is that post-secondary education then and now is not 
compulsory and, with the rare exception of a prodigy, does not involve children. 
The second, which is harder for the current generation to grasp, is one that the 
litigation arm of the NAACP, the so-called Inc. Fund, realized as it launched its 
attack on segregation in higher education. In the years before and immediately 
after World War II, before the G.I Bill took effect, attending college was the 
exception rather than the rule for most Americans, with graduate and 
professional education an even less frequent course taken. In effect, this meant 
that these cases focused on much easier targets. Few families and individuals 
had a stake in what was being attacked, and those that did were in important 
respects victims of their own choices. Those limitations evaporated when the 
focus was shifted to matters that involved virtually every American family, 
systematic, compulsory public K-12 education. 
In a series of cases stretching from 1937 to 1950, the Inc. Fund laid waste to 
various schemes designed to keep African-American students out of this 
nation’s public colleges and universities. Most of these involved rather feeble 
attempts to invoke separate but equal through the creation of palpably inferior 
educational institutions.90 Some were more creative, like the Missouri scheme 
 
 87. Id. at 78. 
 88. Id. at 80 (quoting Carey v. City of Atlanta 84 S.E. 456, 459 (Ga. 1915)). 
 89. These victories included any number of important cases that are taught that involve voting 
rights, see, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–62 (1944), and restrictive covenants, Shelley 
v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). 
 90. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634, 636 (1950) (stressing that the education offered 
at a separate law school for minority students was not “substantially equal to that [offered] at . . . the 
University of Texas Law School” and ordering Heman Sweatt’s admission to that institution); 
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640–41 (1950) (“The restrictions 
[imposed on the graduate student] impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions 
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.”); Sipuel v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632 (1948) (per curiam) (holding that the state could 
not reject a law school applicant on account of her race because she is “entitled to secure legal 
education afforded by a state institution”). 
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that authorized payment of the educational expenses “for the legal education of 
negroes, who were citizens of Missouri, in the universities of adjacent states.”91 
All failed, as the Inc. Fund and a receptive Court took aim at policies that did 
not offer “substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and 
Negro . . . students.”92 
Finally, there are the internal facts of the Brown litigation itself, many of 
which range beyond even the most creative law professor hypotheticals. The 
most important is arguably the story of Thurgood Marshall, who was denied the 
opportunity to study law at his home institution, the University of Maryland, and 
forced instead to get his degree at Howard University.93 Marshall’s life story is 
that of an individual of uncommon gifts who overcame substantial obstacles to 
assume a prominent role in the struggles against systematic racial 
discrimination. As the Legal Director of the Inc. Fund he litigated virtually all 
the major desegregation and discrimination cases that came before the Court. 
And as the first African American to sit on that bench, he brought rare insights 
and wisdom to the administration of justice from his appointment in 1967 until 
his retirement in 1991. 
Then there is the role of fate and happenstance. It is somewhat common 
knowledge that Brown was argued twice. The first time was in December 1952. 
The Court was closely divided and it seemed certain that any decision it might 
issue would be deeply divisive, both in terms of the Court itself and in its 
potential impact in a nation where significant segments of the population—and 
not simply in the South—were deeply opposed to the integration of the public 
schools.94 The Chief Justice at the time was Fred Vinson, a Son of the South 
whose Kentucky ancestors were slave holders and a man who has appropriately 
been described as someone who was “reluctan[t] to advance African American 
rights beyond a line he judged not to be intrusive on white sensibilities.”95 Led 
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, a block on the Court secured agreement that the 
cases should be held over for reargument, primarily on the question of the history 
and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also on the remedial questions 
posed by the cases. It was at this point that the hand of fate intervened. On 
September 8, 1953, Fred Vinson suffered a heart attack and died. Learning of 
this, Justice Frankfurter, convinced that a major obstacle to a just resolution of 
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Brown had now vanished, told one of his former clerks “[t]his is the first 
indication I have ever had that there is a God.”96 
Vinson’s death led to a decision that would have a profound impact on 
Brown and on constitutional law and the Supreme Court in general. When the 
Court reconvened for the second set of arguments in Brown the center seat on 
the bench was occupied by Earl Warren, the new Chief Justice of the United 
States. Warren may, or may not, have owed his nomination by President Dwight 
Eisenhower to his decision to eschew his favorite son status and place the 
California delegation behind Eisenhower’s candidacy at the Republican 
National Convention in 1952.97 He certainly was someone whose deep 
involvement in the “resettlement” of California’s Japanese-American citizens 
during the early years of World War II gave him profound insights into a 
principle articulated by the Court in 1943, albeit not honored in the case in which 
it was pronounced: “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality.”98 
Warren’s leadership of the Court in the wake of the reargument proved 
decisive. He was able to bring the Justices together behind a single, unanimous 
opinion. That unanimity was critical. It did little to assuage the citizens of the 
South, who were appalled that they were now confronted with the prospect of 
sending their sons and daughters to school with children that many of them 
deemed inferior. It also, for that matter, was a less than thrilling result for many 
individuals in the North, who harbored racist sentiments no less pronounced than 
their southern brethren that they hid behind a veneer of tolerance.99 
Neither Vinson’s death nor Warren’s nomination and confirmation were 
part of the Brown litigation strategy. Both were nevertheless critical to its 
success. And both are elements of an approach to teaching Brown that give 
students a deeper appreciation for the many factors, planned and unplanned, that 
combine to yield a result in a case. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Holmes Lecture he delivered on April 7, 1959, Professor Herbert 
Wechsler had the temerity to suggest that Brown was problematic.100 Brown, he 
argued, was poorly reasoned, a case in which “the separate-but-equal formula 
was not overruled ‘in form’ but was held to have ‘no place’ in public education 
on the ground that segregated schools are ‘inherently unequal.’”101 As such, it 
did not embody what he believed to be a proper approach: “one that rests on 
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality 
and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”102 
Wechsler’s critique was wide-ranging and criticized a number of decisions he 
found wanting. Nevertheless, he singled out Brown. The reaction was swift and 
predictable. Then-Professor Louis H. Pollak, for example, conceded some of 
Brown’s arguable shortcomings,103 things he well understood as one member of 
the team that litigated the cases.104 But he also declared that “the judgment in 
the segregation cases will as the decades pass give ever deeper meaning to our 
national life. It will endure as long as our Constitution and democratic faith 
endure.”105 
I’m not for a minute intimating that my flirtations with relegating Brown to 
the pedagogical recycle bin places me in the same company as Professor 
Wechsler and Judge Pollak. I know better. I also understand that most 
constitutional law professors reading this piece will react with, at best, a 
resounding “duh” to many aspects of what I have said in this Essay. That said, I 
also believe that most professors accord Brown a central place in their syllabi as 
a matter of reflex rather than reflection. Which may or may not be a problem, 
depending on how they teach the case. 
The best possible approach to the lessons that lie within and spring from 
Brown is not to teach the case itself, but rather to require that the students read 
widely in the history of discrimination. In particular, they need to learn the full 
story of the Brown litigation. The study of law in a law school is not, sad to say, 
an academic exercise in the traditional sense. We teach in professional schools 
that, by and large, confer first professional degrees. We think of ourselves as 
scholars, but our students are not enrolled in the sorts of courses that prepare 
them for academic research. And neither our curricula or courses are the sort 
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that typify a true graduate school, where extensive and deep reading are the 
norm. 
We cannot accordingly make the sorts of reading assignments that are the 
norm in advanced courses in history or political science. Richard Kluger’s 
Simple Justice is 778 pages long and everyone who purports to care about the 
Constitution and racial justice should read it. Which is to say, every law student. 
I wish I could assign it and expect each of my students to read it with care. I 
can’t. Not, that is, if I am expected to cover in any sort of depth all of the myriad 
constitutional provisions and cases that are essential parts of a four-credit hour 
introductory course. Or, more tellingly, if I wish to retain even a modicum of 
good will on the part of students who believe they are already overburdened 
simply reading edited cases. 
So, I am left with two choices: eliminate Brown from the syllabus or teach 
it as best I can, with a very strong emphasis on all the issues, events, and contexts 
that are not part and parcel of that eloquent but exceedingly terse opinion. For 
the time being, Brown lives in my constitutional law course. Whether that 
continues to be the case is something only time will tell. 
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